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Toward a Psychological Analysis of
the Sentence from the Work of Lashley,
Chomsky, Wundt, Polanyi, and Skousen's AML
Bruce L. Brown

ashley (1951) and Chomsky (1957)
clearly demonstrated the inadequacy
of "left-right" associationistic models
in accounting for language and other kinds
of holistically patterned behavior. Both
argued persuasively that the kind of holistic
dependencies among elements that characterize language syntax cannot be explained
through behavioristic S-R connections.
Chomsky (1957, 18-25) began his attack on
behavioristic theories of language by demonstrating the inadequacy of Markov processes
(a precise embodiment of S-R chaining theory) in accounting for patterned sequences of
behavior. In particular, he showed that the
kinds of holistic dependencies among elements that characterize syntactic structures
in language could not be accounted for with
left-right associationistic models, but rather,
would require a top-down hierarchical
approach.
In his influential paper on the problem of
serial order in behavior, Lashley (1951) made
a similar case for the necessity of hierarchical
explanation, but from a neurological point of
view. The lines of his argument were quite
different from Chomsky'S. Chomsky'S argument was essentially formal and based upon
artificial models of logical mechanisms.
Lashley's argument was neurological, but
also conversational and straightforward. He
first reviewed a variety of anecdotal observations concerning language and then asked
what kind of neurological organization
would be necessary to account for them.
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He pointed out that a given set of
phonemes in spoken words (or of letters in
typed words) can occur in a number of combinations, such as the reverse combinations
right and tire (p. 115). Lashley then made the
very obvious point that "the order must
therefore be imposed upon the motor elements by some organization other than direct
associative connections between them"
(1951, 115). He further argued that words
stand in relation to sentences as letters do in
relation to words, and that words also have
no intrinsic temporal valence as implied by
the associative chaining models. Drawing
upon an analysis of the language translation
process, he argued that this syntactic order is
also not to be attributed to the thought
process-the same thought can be expressed
with quite different temporal structures in
different languages. Translators translate
holistic thoughts, not word by word. As he
summarized: "the mechanism which determines the serial activation of the motor units
is relatively independent, both of the motor
units and (also) of the thought structure."
Lashley (p. 115) argued that language is not
the only example of this kind of syntactically
structured behavior, that a multitude of
skilled behaviors in man and other animals
display this kind of implicit hierarchical
structure and cannot be explained in terms of
associative connections among the elements.
Wundt (1912, Chap. 7, "Die Satzfiigung")
reasoned from a very different perspective.
His primary task was to explain the formation
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of sentences. He reasoned that any explanation of the sentence that focuses only
upon its surface structure would obviously
be inadequate. He characterized the
sentence as "both a simultaneous and a
sequential structure" (see p. 21 of
Blumenthal). It is simultaneous because at
any given moment it is present in consciousness as a totality even as the individual words are spoken. We focus upon the
whole of what we are saying even as the
words flow forth in a habitual way that is
not introspectible to us. As he said:
The sentence, however, is not an
image running with precision
through consciousness where each
single word or single sound appears
only momentarily while the preceding and following elements are lost
from consciousness. Rather, it stands
as a whole at the cognitive level while
it is being spoken. If this should ever
not be the case, we would irrevocably
lose the thread of speech. (quoted in
Blumenthal 1970, 21)
Like Chomsky, Wundt held that any
explanation of the sentence that focuses
only upon its surface structure would
be obviously inadequate. But unlike
Chomsky's position, both Wundt's
account and that of Lashley left open the
question of whether the psychology
of the sentence requires one to posit
the literal existence of syntactical rules
in the human psyche.
Clearly a strong case can be made
for an explanation of patterned serial
behavior that does not attribute it to
associative connections among the elements. However, we cannot consider that
demonstration to be equivalent to making
the case for rule-based explanations.
Some have taken it this way. In particular, the Chomskian approach put phrase
structure rewrite rules and transformational rules in center stage and imbued
them with ontological status, thus opening the way for a new era of mentalism in
the behavioral sciences. The new artificial

intelligence (AI) brand of cognitive
psychology further built upon this
unbridled mechanistic mentalism, much
to the detriment of a truly cognitive
approach to explanation. The excesses of
the AI movement were at least as outrageous as those of the behaviorists a
decade or two earlier. The behaviorists
insisted on mechanistic explanations, but
also on the law of parsimony. Neocognitivists seem to be willing to sacrifice
parsimony as long as a computer
metaphor is satisfied, to guarantee mechanistic explanation.
But parsimony still makes sense.
There is no reason to create complex,
burdensome explanations if simpler ones
will suffice. Polanyi's characterization of
the nature of skills led the way for us
here. He began his discussion of the
psychology of skills (1962) with the
trenchant statement:
I shall take as my clue for this
investigation the well-known fact
that the aim of a skilful performance is
achieved by the observance of a set of
rules which are not known as such to
the person following them. (49)
He then went on to offer explanations
of the physical principles underlying
swimming and riding a bicycle, but with
the caveat that one certainly would not
have to understand those explanations to
perform either of these skills. Either of
these skills is acquired tacitly through
trial and error, or through apprenticeship,
but without explicit awareness of the
principles involved. This approach to
explaining the acquisition of skills
(including linguistic skill) is consonant
with influential theories of perception,
such as the "transactionalism" of
Ames (1946) and Kilpatrick (1961)
and J. J. Gibson's theory (1966) of
"direct perception."
A full explanation of the principles
involved in any of these skills is probably
beyond our present scientific capability.
However, Polanyi (1962) offered the
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following as a first approximation
of the physical principles involved in
riding a bicycle:
Again, from my interrogations of
physicists, engineers and bicycle
manufacturers, I have come to the
co~clusion that the principle by
wh1ch the cyclist keeps his balance is
not generally known. The rule
observed by the cyclist is this. When
he starts falling to the right he turns
the handle-bars to the right, so that
the course of the bicycle is deflected
along a curve towards the right. This
results in a centrifugal force pushing
the cyclist to the left and offsets the
gravitational force dragging him
down to the right. This manoeuvre
presently throws the cyclist out of
balance to the left, which he counteracts by turning the handlebars to the
left; and so he continues to keep himsel~ in balance by winding along a
senes of appropriate curvatures. A
simple analysis shows that for a
given angle of unbalance the curvature of each winding is inversely
proportional to the square of the
~peed at which the cyclist is proceedmg. But does this tell us exactly how
to ride a bicycle? No. You obviously
cannot adjust the curvature of your
bicycle's path in proportion to
the ratio of your unbalance over the
square of your speed; and if you
could you would fall off the machine
for there are a number of other factor~
to be taken into account in practice
which are left out in the formulation
of this rule. Rules of art can be useful, but they do not determine
the practice of an art; they are maxims, which can serve as a guide to an
art only if they can be integrated into
the practical knowledge of the art.
They cannot replace this knowledge.
(49-50)
. .Obviously, being able to explain bicycle
ndmg at this high level of abstraction

and ?~ysical decomposition is not a prereqUIs1te to performing the skill. There are
many six- and seven-year-old children
",:"ho have mastered the skill of riding a
b1cycle, but the explanation given above
would probably mean very little to any of
them. Nor would it make sense to hypothesize the existence of "rules" of this kind in
their heads, a kind of inborn, unconscious,
unintrospectible BRAD ("bicycle riding
acquisition device"). There are many ways
to explain what one is doing, some
explicitly physical (such as the foregoing),
some metaphorical, some complex, and
some simple, but probably none of these
levels of explanation fully captures or
exhausts what is actually going on.
I remember hearing Chomsky say in
a talk at McGill University in 1967 that
the logical capability implicit in the lingui~tic performance of a typical three-year
old 1S more complex than the principles of
calculus. At the time I found that statement preposterous. With thirty-five more
years of experience the statement now
seems obvious and correct. The two sentences "They are easy to please" and
"They are eager to please" at first seem
alike in structure, and their surface structure
is similar. However, an impersonal transformation shows that they are very different in deep structure: ''It is easy to
please them," but not ''It is eager to please
them." Polanyi would explain this in
terms of the contrast between tacit
knowledge and explicit knowledge. We
have a tacit apprehension of linguistic
principles of great depth and subtlety,
but we do not have explicit knowledge of
the principles involved. Chomsky'S subtle
and complex linguistic rules could be
viewed in this framework as being an
explicit spelling out of the logic underlying wh~t every person can do linguistically w1thout taking thought, without
being able to introspect. T. G. R. Bower
(1977) and his colleagues have shown
that P~aget's (1954) developmental stages
for chIldren are much too conservative.
Infants and young children have a tacit
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mastery of various cognitive tasks long
before they can give proper explicit
accounts, and Piaget made the mistake of
basing his stages on what children would
say, what they could explain.
One of the major approaches to
language and cognition to come forth in
the past thirty years is the work of the
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP)
Group (Rumelhart, McClelland, and the
PDP Research Group 1986), so-called
"neural nets" or "connectionist models."
The connectionist models capitalize on
this "levels of explanation" approach,
with the proposal that fairly simple
associationistic mechanisms can be modeled on a computer to create close
approximations to behavior that appears
to be rule-governed. Chandler (1995)
summarizes their major achievement:
"They have shown that rule-like regularities can emerge from the massed interaction of relatively simple processes
operating on homogeneous networks of
information even though those networks
contain and refer to no explicit representations of those rules" (234-35). The
strategy is an ingenious one, and it
has won for D. O. Hebb's neurological
behavioristic associationism (on which
PDP is based) a new hearing within contemporary cognitive psychology.
Skousen's (1989) analogical modeling
of language (AML) also accounts for
seemingly rule-governed behavior without recourse to explicitly represented
rules. The approach is based upon a very
simple principle of "natural statistics": to
minimize the number of disagreements
(Skousen 1992). In the same way that the
complexities of hypothesized internalized
linguistic rules can be avoided with this
approach, the complexities of statistical
decision theories can also be avoided.
That is, there is no need to posit that the
learner acquires some kind of "probabilistic rule" for dealing with linguistic
categorization. Rather, his performance
can be accounted for by the simple proposition that he samples from his own

stored linguistic experiences using this
one basic principle. Close approximations to actual performance can be
achieved by adjusting the level of
"imperfect memory." It is intriguing how
such a simple hypothesized process can
create complex behavior that could be
explained at the highest level in terms of
a complex and subtle rule system of the
kind Chomsky has described.
Both the connectionist models (PDP)
and AML are what Skousen (1995, 227)
referred to as "procedural" as contrasted
with rule approaches, which are "declarative." As procedural models, both AML
and PDP avoid the major conceptual
problems encountered in rule-based
models. Skousen (1995) identified at least
three such problems: rule-governed
approaches cannot deal with "leakage"
across category boundries; they are not
robust in dealing with missing information or ill-formed context in the way that
actual speakers are; and they are pushed
to revert to a competence/ performance
distinction to account in an ad hoc way
for failures of the model to deal with real,
dynamic aspects of language.
AML has a number of features to
recommend it over other available
procedural language models. One is its
explicit incorporation of episodic memory
into the learning process. Another is its
potential to account for more general
perceptual processes beyond language.
Both Skousen (1995) and Chandler (1995)
have pointed to a number of failings of the
connectionist models that AML seems to
overcome. For one, connectionist models,
once trained, are deterministic and cannot handle probability matching.
Furthermore, connectionist network
training can often require an inordinately
long time even for simple behaviors, can
get stuck in local minima, and even when
trained cannot adjust to learn new input
but rather collapses into predicting
nonsense (the so-called "catastrophe
problem"). AML, on the other hand, is
particularly good at probability matching
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in a way that corresponds to actual
human language learners. Also, no training
is necessary, there are no local minima,
and it adjusts well to new input, even
contradictory input.
There are particular problems yet to
be solved in the application of AML. One
of the biggest problems is computational. With commonly used computational
methods, each variable that is added
essentially doubles the processing time
as well as the memory requirements of
the computer. Also, the notable successes of AML have been in the more
well-defined areas of phonetics /
phonology, orthography, and morphology. Application to more abstract and difficult areas of semantics and syntax has
yet to be demonstrated. However, initial
work with syntax looks promising.
Lonsdale (2001), for example, has found
some success in translating from French
to English using analogical cloning,
following the method of Jones (1996).
The probability matching aspect of
analogical modeling is particularly
interesting to psychologists in that it foreshadows the possibility of higher level
theoretical integration with other
established principles of human and
animal behavior. A case in point is the
well known matching law of Richard
Herrnstein (1961) whereby probabilities
of response are found to match
probabilities of reinforcement. There
are probably many linguistic examples
of probability matching of this kind.
Tucker and his colleagues (1968), as one
example, have documented a linguistic
probability matching in native French
speakers with respect to the categorization
of grammatical gender of "artificial"
French words. They found a close match
between the gender selection probabilities
for various invented words and the gender
probabilities for words with the same
endings in Petit Larousse. Skousen (1995)
recognized this capacity of AML to deal
with the ubiquitous phenomenon of
probability matching as one of the many

advantages of AML over neural networks. AML can be seen as a sophisticated
extension of associationistic principles,
one that makes them capable of accounting
for seemingly rule-governed behavior.
Given the arguments for the superiority
of the AML approach to the modeling of
human linguistic behavior, it could be
argued that this paper has come full circle
back to the associationistic approach
criticized by Lashley and Chomsky.
However, this is not just a case of "rocks
break scissors, scissors cut paper, and
paper covers rocks." A better metaphor
would be an upward spiral, where
the associationism implied in analogical
modeling represents a much higher
level of sophistication than the simple
left-right associationistic chain theory
that still falls vulnerable to the
Lashley / Chomsky critique. Nor does
it mean that with the continued
ascension of analogical modeling we
would expect to witness the demise
of rule-governed approaches. In the
concluding paragraphs of his fundamental work on analogical modeling,
Skousen discussed the place of rule
approaches:
Despite the many arguments, both
empirical and conceptual, in favor of
an analogical approach to the description of language, there is a place for
rule approaches too. An optimal rule
description serves as a kind of metalanguage that efficiently describes
past behavior and allows us to talk
about that behavior. Whenever we
attempt to summarize behavior or to
discover relationships in data, our
viewpoint is structuralist. But if we
wish to predict language behavior
rather than just describe it, we must
abandon rule approaches. Rule
descriptions have great difficulty in
explaining actual language usage.
(1989, 139)
Skousen went on to compare language rules with Boyle's Law and

21

BRUCE L. BROWN

22

Charles's Law as general physical laws
that are only approximations to the real
behavior of gasses. They are fairly accurate in accounting for gas molecules
acting in the aggregate under most
conditions, yet they have no real existence
except in the minds of scientists. He made
this comparison with linguistic rules:
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In no literal sense can it be said that
individual gas molecules follow these
laws. In a similar way, linguistic rules
are meta-descriptive devices that
exist only in the minds of linguists.
Speakers do not appear to use rules
in perceiving and producing language. Moreover, linguistic rules can
only explain language behavior for
ideal si tua tions. As in physics,
an atomistic approach seems to be a
more promising method for predicting language behavior. (1989, 140)
This is reminiscent of Polanyi's characterization of a skillful performance as
being achieved by the observance of a set
of rules which are not known as such to
the person following them. Linguistic
behavior can be described in a general
way by rules, but an analogical modeling
approach is probably much closer to the
actual psychological processes involved
and accounts better for actual linguistic
behavior (performance). Skousen's illuminating comments on the place of rules
and analog constitute a fitting conclusion
to his first published book on analogical
modeling. They are also, perhaps, a
promising prelude to the construction of
a serious account of the psychology of
the sentence, that mysterious process by
which our holistic thoughts are automatically converted into a string of words.
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